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Buckley Over Time:




Nothing in American history-not the left's recent campus "speech codes," not the
right's depredations during 1950s McCarthyism or the 1920s "red scare," not the
Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s-maiches the menace to the First Amend-
ment posed by campaign "reforms" advancing under the protective coloration of
political hygiene .... What today's campaign reformers desire is a steadily thick-
ening clot of laws and on enforcing bureaucracy to control both the quantity and
the content of all discourse pertinent to politics.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of funding public election campaigns with private contributions and
expenditures is older than our nation itself. George Washington, during his campaign
for the Virginia House of Burgesses, is said to have distributed more than a quart and
a half of rum, wine, beer and hard cider per person in his district.2 In 1828, a candi-
date for governor of Kentucky was soliciting campaign contributions of $5000 and
$10,000.' In the 1896 presidential race, William McKinley raised and spent between
$6 and $7 million." The Kennedys spent at least $2 million (nearly $11 million in
today's dollars), and possibly twice that amount, just in the 1960 West Virginia Presi-
dential primary.5 In 1996, labor unions contributed over $40 million directly to candi-
dates and political parties.6 Simply put, money has always been a part of the Ameri-
can political process.
* Craig M. Engle is General Counsel to the National Republican Senatorial Committee. He for-
merly served as Executive Assistant to Commissioner Lee Ann Elliott of the Federal Election Commis-
sion. John DiLorenzo, Jr. is a shareholder of the Portland, Oregon law firm of Hagen, Dye, Hirschy &
DiLorenzo, P.C. Charles Spies, J.D. candidate, 1998, Georgetown University Law Center, B.A., Univer-
sity of Michigan.
1. George F. Will, Here Come the Speech Police, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at C7.
2. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLrncs, A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY IN PoLmcs 3 (1995) (citing
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INc., DOLLAR PoLrrcs (3d ed. 1982)).
3. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLIncs, supra note 2, at 3 (citing GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES
THE MONEY TREE? AMERICAN CAMPAIGN PRACTIcnEs FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT (1974)).
4. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLmcs, supra note 2, at 5.
5. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE DARK SIDE OF CAMELOT 90 (1997).
6. Top Contributors in the 1995-96 Election Cycle, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1997, at A25 (citing
Center for Responsive Politics). Seven of the top ten direct contributors to candidates and parties were
labor unions. The $40 million given directly to candidates and parties is exclusive of the estimated
over $100 million that labor unions spent on independent expenditures, issue advertisements and grass-
roots electioneering in the 1996 election cycle. Id.
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There is also a long history of American legal precedent protecting this practice.
At the birth of modem First Amendment jurisprudence in 193 1,7 the Supreme Court
observed that maintaining "free political discussion to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people" was "a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system."8 First Amendment9 doctrine has "primarily sought to protect from govern-
ment regulation an independent realm of speech within which public opinion is under-
stood to be forged."'" Further, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that political
speech enjoys the highest protection under the First Amendment."
Yet in the name of "campaign finance reform," there is now a growing assault
on our established First Amendment right to political speech. 2 This article will not
attempt to critique the array of current campaign finance reform proposals. 3 Instead,
we will focus on a new constitutional problem that inflation and the increasing cost of
campaigns have created for just one of the existing post-Watergate campaigu laws: the
individual contribution limit to Federal candidates established in 1974."
Section 315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),' 5 codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441a, limits contributions from persons to any federal candidate to $1000
with respect to any election for federal office. 6 This section of the Act, originally
enacted in 1974, has never been indexed for inflation. Congress, of course, has the
power to increase this individual contribution limit, just as it has indexed other areas of
7. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
8. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
9. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law .. abridging the freedom of
speech ... or the right of. the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST., amend. I.
10. Post, supra note 7, at 151.
11. The Buckley Court wrote, "Discussion of public issues and debates on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). As Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States District Court
of the Eastern District of California, Lawrence Karlton more recently observed, "From the uncompro-
mising terms of the [First] Amendment it would seem that devising any test upholding limits on politi-
cal speech or association would be a difficult task indeed, requiring, if permitted at all, the most deli-
cate of judgments, predicated on the most persuasive evidence of the need to serve not only legitimate
but urgent governmental interests." California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No.
Civ. S-96-1965, slip op. at 3-4 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998).
12. Lawmakers, behind the cover of "campaign finance reform," are attempting to establish sweep-
ing federal controls over political communication. See Douglas Johnson & Mike Beard, "Campaign
Reform": Let's Not Give Politicians the Power to Decide What We Can Say About Them (Cato Insti-
tute Briefing Paper No. 31, July 4, 1997) (on file with author).
13. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1258 (1994); Johnson & Beard, supra note 12; Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks:
Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. LJ. 45 (1997); Bradley A. Smith,
Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE LJ.
1049 (1996).
14. While this article focuses on federal individual contribution limits, many of the same argu-
ments apply to low contribution limits on the state level. Some states, such as Montana and Missouri,
have adopted through ballot initiatives contribution limits as low as $100 for state legislature seats. A
BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY IN POLMcs, CENTER FOR RIISPONSiVE PoLrrcs 5 (1995).
15. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. I, sec. 112(2),
§ 320, 90 Stat. 475, 486 renumbered by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-187, tit. I, § 105(5), 93 Stat. 1339, 1354 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994)). The original
version of the $1000 contribution limit was enacted in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, tit. I, § 101(a), 88 Stat 1263, 1263, repealed by Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. II, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 475, 496.
16. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1994).
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campaign spending such as the Presidential Election Campaign Fund "check-off' and
the coordinated spending limits for political parties.'7 We believe an increase in the
individual contribution limit, along with continued indexing for inflation, should be a
part of any campaign finance reform. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky), the most
vocal opponent in the Senate of McCain-Feingold-type campaign finance reforms, is a
strong advocate of increasing the out-dated limits on individual hard money
contributions." Norman Ornstein, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,
has recommended a substantial increase in the individual contribution limits from the
present $1000 to $25,000, with annual adjustments for inflation, 9 and the American
Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Election Law has recommended that
the current contribution limits be significantly raised, or at a minimum indexed for
inflation." Even President Clinton has conceded that "hard money contribution limits
ought to be realistic in light of today's cost."'"
But apart from these policy approaches, it is important to understand the new
constitutional problems with the current $1000 limit, which has now been in place for
over twenty years. Because of inflation, the $1000 individual contribution limit upheld
in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo22 is worth only one-third of its original value. This
means FECA no longer precludes just large contributions. Instead, the law now permits
only contributions of a negligible value in terms of 1976 dollars, and no longer allows
contributors to provide substantial financial assistance to candidates, who in turn are
not able to amass sufficient resources to mount effective campaigns.
Accordingly, the distinction in degree between the value of $1000 in 1976 and
today has become a legal difference "in kind," making the current $1000 individual
contribution limit no longer narrowly tailored to the government's interest and there-
fore constitutionally impermissible.
I. BUCKLEY CREATES THE FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
In the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court held that political
contributions (the act of giving money to a candidate) and expenditures (candidates
spending the money raised) were both forms of protected speech.23 Contributions,
however, were afforded less protection than campaign expenditures.24 While the Court
17. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, tit. XIII, ch. 1, § 13441, 107 Stat.
416, 567-68 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6096(a) (1994)) (increasing the individual contribution designation
to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund from one dollar to three dollars); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c), 26
U.S.C. §§ 9008(b)(5), 9035(a) (1994) (indexing for inflation the Presidential Election Campaign Fund,
convention financing and the coordinated spending limits for political parties).
18. Senator Mitch McConnell, The Money Gag, NAT'L REv., June 30, 1997, at 36.
19. William Raspberry, When Pigs Can Fly, WASH. POST, OCL 3, 1997, at A19.
20. Memorandum from Pauline Schneider, Chair of ABA Standing Committee on Election Law to
Chairs and Liasons of ABA Sections, Divisions and Forums, Chair of the Task Force on Lawyers' Po-
litical Contributions, Presidents and Executive Directors of State Bar Associations (Dec. 12, 1997) (on
file with author).
21. Transcript of Clinton Remarks at DNC Dinner Jan. 8, U.S. NEwsw]RE, Jan. 9, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 56b2097.
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. Id. at 14-23.
24. Justice Thomas, in his forceful concurring and dissenting opinion in Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996), argues that he
"would reject the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo for analyzing the constitutionality of cam-
paign finance laws [between contributions and expenditures] . . . . In my view, the distinction lacks
1998l
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extended complete protection to campaign expenditures by striking down the FECA
expenditure limits,' the Justices, in an oft-quoted paragraph, stated:
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation
upon the amount that any one person or group can contribute to a candidate or
[PAC] entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in
free communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for
the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase per-
ceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution
provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the
candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give.., thus in-
volves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the sym-
bolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way
infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.2"
The Court then noted that contribution limits are a "significant interference with
protected rights of political association,"'.. and framed the applicable test as whether
the federal government "demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs
means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." '2
Thus, the test involves two determinations: (1) is the governmental interest sufficiently
important, and if so, (2) is the restriction narrowly tailored to address the compelling
interest without unnecessarily abridging freedoms of expression and association.29 The
restriction must be narrowly tailored in its effect on both the contributor's speech and
the candidate's right to communicate his or her campaign message.
The Buckley Court then found the government's interest of avoiding corruption
or the appearance of corruption to be the only lawful basis that could justify any limi-
tation on campaign contributions.' The Court found this interest was sufficient to
justify the limited effects upon First Amendment freedoms that a $1000 contribution
limit would have on individuals in 1976.3'
constitutional significance, and I would not adhere to it . . .As Justice Burger put it: '[C]ontributions
and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin."' Id. at 2323, 2325. Justice Thom-
as continues, "[A] contribution is simply an indirect expenditure; though contributions and expenditures
may thus differ in form, they do not differ in substance." Id. at 2327. The Citizen Legislative and
Political Freedom Act, H.R. 965. 105th Cong. (1997), introduced by Congressman John Doolittle (R-
Cal.) along with sixty-six cosponsors, provides a legislative response to Justice Thomas' concerns by
repealing limits on both individual and political action committee contributions to candidates or parties,
and by repealing limits on how much parties can contribute to candidates. In stark contrast, others,
such as Judge Skelly Wright, argue that money is not speech, and therefore even political expenditures
can be regulated without violating the speech rights of the person making the expenditures. J. Skelly
Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18-21.
26. Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 25.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. For a statute to be closely drawn the means chosen must not "burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Ward v. Rock Against Rac-
ism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989); see also California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully,
No. Civ. S-96-1965, slip op. at 26-27 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (citing Ward and Service Employees
Int'l Union v. Federal Political Practices Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312, 1322 (9th Cir. 1992)).
30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29.
31. Id. at 29.
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Today, however, the value of a $1000 contribution is just $320 in terms of 1976
dollars. 32 As a result of inflation, the $1000 FECA contribution limits are no longer
constitutionally permissible under the Buckley framework stated above. In particular,
the present nonindexed limits are no longer narrowly tailored because: (1) they reach
smaller contributions that do not corrupt or give the appearance of corruption, (2) they
do not allow the contributor to engage in meaningful expression and association
through substantial contributions and (3) they do not allow many candidates to amass
sufficient resources to effectively communicate a campaign message.33 Although there
is considerable overlap among these three points, each provides an independent and
sufficient justification why the current individual contribution limits have changed "in
kind" and are unconstitutional.
m. THE "DIFFERENCE IN KIND" STANDARD FOR EVALUATING
NONINDEXED CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
We begin from the baseline assumption that a $1000 individual contribution limit
was constitutionally permissible in 1976. While the Buckley Court refused to address
the specific dollar amount of FECA's contribution limits, the Court did caution that if
contribution limits are "too low," the limits could be unconstitutional.34 This "too
low" standard is of limited utility because it begs the question of when a limit actually
becomes too low. We must look elsewhere in Buckley and more recent jurisprudence
to determine when a contribution limit legally becomes too low. Although the Court in
Buckley conceded that "a court has no scalpel to probe"35 whether a different contri-
bution limit would have served as well as the $1000 ceiling, the Court continued that
these, "distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount
to differences in kind.
36
For example, the Buckley Court employed its different holdings in Kusper v.
Pontikes" and Rosario v. Rockefeller3 to illuminate when a distinction in degree be-
comes a difference in kind.3' The Buckley Court observed (and the Eight Circuit re-
cently emphasized in Carver v. Nixon"') that the distinction between an eight month
and a twenty-four month delay in the ability to vote was so large that it had a different
32. As of January 1998, the $1000 limit has a value of approximately $320 in terms of 1976
dollars. Inflation is calculated using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data provided by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Because December 1997 data was not available at the time of this article's publication, data
for 1997 is an average of the monthly CPI from January to November 1997, and at 310.1% inflation
from 1976 to 1997,.$1000 is now worth $322.48. Assuming current inflationary trends (and for conve-
nience), we rounded $322.48 down to $320.00. For an analysis of the impact of inflation on the value
of contributions, see Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994), in which the court stated
that "a $100 contribution in 1976 would have a value of $40.60 in 1994 dollars, or approximately
four percent of the $1,000 limit approved in Buckley." Viewing the decreased value of an individual
contribution from the time frame of the legislation, rather than Buckley, the value of $1000 today was
only $300 when the limit was enacted in 1974. See supra note 15.
33. The current devalued limits also increase the need for candidates to spend time fundraising
and increase reliance on political action committees, soft money and independent expenditures.
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
35. Id. at 30 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
36. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30; California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No.
Civ. S-96-1965, slip op. at 20 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998).
37. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
38. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
39. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
40. Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995).
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effect and became a difference in kind. Rosario's shorter delay was constitutionally al-
lowable while Kusper's longer delay was not:4' "Although the Court allowed an
eight-month delay in Rosario, the almost two-year delay in Kusper, nearly three times
the delay approved in Rosario, crossed the Constitutional line,"'4 amounting to a dif-
ference in kind.
As stated in Buckley, this "difference in kind" analysis is the framework for
evaluating when a permissible contribution limit becomes impermissibly low. On its
face, the ratio of the difference between what was ruled permissible in Rosario and
impermissible in Kusper is similar to the ratio of the value of the individual contri-
bution limit approved by the Court in 1976 and the value of a contribution under that
limit today. Just as there was a three-to-one ratio between the permissible eight month
delay and the impermissible twenty-four month delay, there is also an approximately
three-to-one ratio between the value of a $i000 contribution in 1976, and the value of
$1000 today, which is just $320 in 1976 dollars. This comparable ratio of difference
provides at least mechanical evidence of the changed nature of the $1000 limit. More
important, however, is the legal effect of the decreasing value of a $1000 contribution.
In the next section, we will examine this effect: first, on the government's interest in
eliminating an appearance of corruption stemming from large contributions, second, on
a contributor's associational and speech rights and third, on the candidate's right to
communicate a campaign message. Together, these factors substantiate the argument
that the diminishing value of a $1000 contribution, after over two decades, has become
a difference in kind rather than merely a distinction in degree.
IV. APPLYING THE "DIFFERENCE IN KIND" STANDARD TO THE
CURRENT EFFECTS OF THE $1000 CONTRIBUTION LIMIT
A. Significance of the Government's Interest in Avoiding the Appearance of
Corruption
We believe the passage of time, and the decreased value of the $1000 allowable
contribution limit, have not diminished the government's interest in regulating cam-
paign finance. Just as in 1976, the government's stated desire to prevent corruption and
its appearance by limiting large campaign contributions remains today.43 But the key
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30. The Court in Rosario approved a party enrollment provision requir-
ing a voter to enroll in the next party primary even though the cutoff date for enrollment could occur
up to eight months before a presidential primary and up to eleven months' before a nonpresidential pri-
mary. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 760. The Court held that the requirement was not arbitrary and uncon-
nected to the important state goal of inhibiting party raiding. Id. In contrast, the same Court just a
few months after the Rosario decision, ruled impermissible in Kusper a party enrollment requirement
that prohibited a voter from voting in the primary election of a political party if he or she voted in
the primary of. another party in the preceding twenty-three months. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 61. The Court
in Kusper reaffirmed its previous decision in Rosario, but held that the enrollment requirement at issue
could potentially cause a two year delay for certain voters. The risk of a two year delay was enough
to violate the voter's right to free political association. Id. at 51.
42. Carver, 72 F.3d at 641.
43. "[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are [sic] the only legitimate and com-
pelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances." Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985); see also
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. While it is possible that some courts would also regard eliminating "the
corrosive and distorting effects" of money in the context of uncontrolled corporate spending, Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), that rationale is not applicable to the present
discussion of individual contributions.
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inquiry is-at what point today is a contribution large enough to create an appearance
of corruption," and therefore trigger the state interest? In Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol v. City of Berkeley,45 the Supreme Court emphasized that "Buckley identified a
single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the
First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of large
contributions to a candidate." In fact, the Eighth Circuit overruled the district court
decision in Carver largely because the lower court did not understand that the state
interest arises only with large contributions.
The district court held that "[u]nder Buckley, [the state] clearly has a compelling
state interest in limiting campaign contributions." This does not square with the in-
terest of limiting "large campaign contributions" as defined in Buckley. The district
court's decision substantially broadens the compelling interest identified in Buckley.
The district court erred as a matter of law in extending Buckley to the infinitely
broader interest of limiting all, not just large, campaign contributions.'
1. A $1000 Contribution Today Does Not Have an Appearance of Corruption
Because of Inflation and the Increased Cost of Running a Campaign since 1976.
Inflation has devalued the allowable contribution limits to the point that the
limits now prohibit contributions that are not "large" and do not present the commen-
surate opportunities for corruption, or even the appearance of corruption. If in 1976, a
contribution limit of $320 would not have been "focused precisely on the problem of
large campaign contributions," then Congress would not have been constitutionally
justified in their infringement upon free speech in the name of avoiding corruption or
its appearance. Campaign contribution limits are subject to the "closest scrutiny"'
and therefore the state must not only demonstrate a "sufficiently important interest,"
but must also employ means closely drawn to avoid the unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms. '9 While some Justices have suggested in dicta that contribu-
tion limits are subject to some level of scrutiny lower than strict scrutiny,'e other Jus-
tices have strongly disagreed.51 The Eighth52 and Ninth Circuits53 have recognized
44. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 499 ("[A] tendency to demonstrate
distrust . . . is not sufficient."); California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. Civ.
S-96-1965, slip op. at 22 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) ("Mhe appearance of corruption must be more than
illusory or conjectural.").
45. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
46. Id. at 296-97 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28) (emphasis added).
47. Carver, 72 F.3d at 639 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 636 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-
61 (1958))).
49. Carver, 72 F.3d at 636 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,
488 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960)).
50. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
(1986); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Califor-
nia Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (Marshall, J., plurality).
51. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Commission, 116 S. Ct.
2309, 2319 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 302 (Blackmun
and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in judgment) ("[Olrdinance cannot survive constitutional challenge unless
it withstands 'exacting scrutiny."'); California Medical Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 201-02 (Blackmun, J., con-
curing in part and in judgment).
52. Carver, 72 F.3d at 637.
53. Harwin v. Goleta Water Dist., 953 F.2d 488, 491 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring the govern-
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that because the Court in Buckley articulated a strict scrutiny standard, and has not
ruled differently since then, the rigorous standard of review applied in Buckley must
continue to be employed. If there is not an appearance of impropriety inherent in a
contribution as small as $320 in 1976, then the current limit is not narrowly tailored,
and therefore is impermissible.
Further, the increased overall cost of campaigns makes a $1000 contribution
much less significant than it was twenty years ago. In 1976 approximately $540 mil-
lion was spent on all United States elections, and by 1996 that figure jumped to over
$4 billion. 4 The amount spent on Senate and House campaigns dramatically increased
from approximately $195 million in the 1977-78 cycle to over $765 million in the
1995-96 cycle,55 or 387%. Simply put, a single $1000 contribution certainly has less
corrupting appearance in today's atmosphere of campaign spending than it did when
examined by the Court In 1....
2. The Devalued Contribution Limit Has Led to Both the Appearance of
Corruption and More Actual Corruption
We also believe that the current artificially low contribution limit is actually
counterproductive to the government's interest of preventing corruption. The nonin-
dexed limit has led to evasion by both contributors and candidate committees as well
as to the appearance of corruption, because money is now channeled away from dis-
closed hard money to other forms of candidate support which are illegal or not as fully
regulated or disclosed.
The current ceiling on contributions has become so low in value that some con-
tributors who want their voices heard are evading the law by contributing in other
peoples names, such as through their children or employees. For example, the number
of contributions of more than $1000 from persons listed as students in Federal Election
Commission (FEC) records has more than quadrupled since 1980.6 This often occurs
when the parents in a family give the maximum contribution to a candidate and then
contribute more in their children's names. At least twenty-five, and perhaps fifty of the
top 400 political donors in 1996 were joined by one or more or their children or
grandchildren in giving to their favorite candidates.57 In 1996 Bill Clinton received at
least $200,000 in "kid aid,"' and Senator Edward Kennedy raised $65,000."9 Many
of these kiddie-cash donations come from sophisticated donors' who know the contri-
ment to show "a sufficiently important interest and employ means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms") (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
54. Campaign Reform Dead? Not According to Public, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 1997, at 14A.
These figures include the amount spent on all United States elections, including local, state and na-
tional offices, political parties, political action committees and ballot issues. See also infra Part IV(C)
for a discussion of the increased cost of campaigns.
55. Federal Election Comm'n, Press Release (Apr. 14, 1997); see also HERBERT E. ALEXANDER,
FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND PoLICAL REFORM, 78-81 (1992).
56. Michelle Malkin, Kiddie-Cash Collections Open Fund-Raising Loophole, SEATTLE TIMES, May
27, 1997, at B4.
57. Id.
58. Carl Kids, DET. NEws, Oct. 12, 1997, at B6. Bob Dole similarly raised $35,000 from chil-
dren donors. Id.
59. Id.
60. "Many of the young donors' parents are longtime political activists who know the rules....
David Grossman, the son of Steven Grossman (the DNC's new head) contributed $25,000. When Hugh
Westbrook headed the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee in 1993-94, it raised about 50 grand
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bution limits but are determined to contribute enough to have their voice heard. While
it is illegal to donate money in another person's name6 the chance of enforcement is
minimal.' As a result, this practice-which is illegal and appears corrupt-is becom-
ing more widespread. This creates exactly the opposite result intended by the contribu-
tion limits: more, not less corruption.
A similar scheme for contributors to evade the contribution limits is for employ-
ers who wish to give over $1000 to a candidate to have their employees contribute,
and then reimburse them. In 1996 Boston industrialist Simon Firestone plead guilty to
federal charges of making $120,000 worth of reimbursements to individuals who con-
tributed to Bob Dole's Presidential campaign. Firestone agreed to pay what was at that
time a record fine of $6 million. 3 While the Firestone violation certainly involved a
larger sum of money than may be involved in most employee reimbursement schemes,
it is representative of the often illegal lengths that contributors sometimes go to under
the current limits to have their voices heard. Raising the contribution limit to a reason-
able level (at least commensurate with what was approved by the Supreme Court in
1976) would allow the vast majority of contributors to have their voices heard in a
direct, legal and fully and accurately disclosed manner." While the evasion of laws
by contributors must not be condoned, the perverse cause of this evasion and its ap-
pearance of corruption should also not be ignored.
Just as contributors have devised schemes to contribute more money, candidates
and campaign committees have also become inventive with schemes to raise enough
money to get their message out. A prime example is the Democratic Senatorial Cam-
paign Committee's (DSCC) "Tally" program for contributors that have already reached
their federal limit by contributing $2000 to the primary and general election campaigns
of their favorite Democratic senator. Under the Democrat's Tally program, a contribu-
tor can write a special $20,000 check to the DSCC and make clear which senator they
want the money to be spent on. The DSCC then tallies how much money was donated
in kiddie cash. . . .Westbrook also had some familial help: His son, now college-age, has given more
than $25,000 over the years." David Mastio, The Kiddie-Cash Caper: Gifts from Minors Are the Next
Big Campaign Loophole (last modified May 21, 1997) <http://www.slate.com/Features/kiddiecash/
kiddiecash.asp>.
61. 2 U.S.C. § 441f (1994) ("No person shall make a contribution in the name of another person
or knowingly permit his name to be used to effect such a contribution, and no person shall knowingly
accept a contribution made by one person in the name of another person.").
62. David Mastio explains that the FEC has never shown much interest in pursuing these viola-
tions and often accepts fantastic excuses. One father informed the FEC that his daughter earned the
money for her $1000 contribution from raising vegetables such as cucumbers and onions. Mastio,
supra note 60.
63. Promises, Promises in Washington, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1997, at E6. Similarly, USA
Waste Services Inc., owners of Empire Sanitary Landfill in Pennsylvania, agreed in October 1997 to
pay an $8 million fine for using corporate funds to reimburse employees for $129,000 in campaign
contributions to federal candidates. Justice Hauls Biggest Fine Ever in Election Law Case: $8 Million,
POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Oct. 22, 1997, at 1.
64. At the Journal of Legislation's Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform held on November
14, 1997, Common Cause's Donald Simon responded that this argument was like arguing that because
people rob banks the laws against bank robbery should be eliminated. Videotape: Campaign Finance
Reform (Journal of Legislation 1997) (on file with author). The difference, however, is that bank rob-
bery is malum in se, while contributing $3000 rather than $1000 to a campaign is malum prohibitum.
Although Common Cause may believe that campaign contributions are inherently evil, for those who
believe that a campaign contribution is important First Amendment expression there is nothing that
makes a $3000 contribution morally different from a $1000 contribution except that the larger contri-
bution is statutorily prohibited.
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to support that senator and earmarks that money to be spent on his or her race.' This
tally both avoids the direct contribution limits and leads to an increased appearance of
corruption because the prophylactic effect of disclosure is removed.'
One of the purposes of FECA was to provide strict disclosure requirements for
contributions so that citizens, watchdog groups, a candidate's opponent and the media
could monitor who contributed to which candidates and assure that there was no quid
pro quo from the candidate in return. Low limits on individual and PAC contribu-
tions,67 however, have pushed contributions out of the fully disclosed (and therefore
easily monitored) realm of hard money into complex schemes like the DSCC tally
program or into soft money and/or independent expenditures. Again, while illegal
schemes cannot be condoned, raising the individual contribution limits would allow
more contributions to be given and reported as hard money.' Our system actually
prefers hard money because there are fewer restrictions on how it can be spent than
soft money and the state interest of avoiding corruption or its appearance through the
prophylactic effect of full disclosure.
B. Contribution Restrictions Are No Longer Narrowly Tailored to Avoid
Unnecessary Abridgment of Contributors' Political Speech
Although the Buckley Court allowed contribution limits of $1000, we suggest
that they would not have permitted contribution limits of $320 in 1976. The difference
between the value of $1000 and $320 is so great that the lower limit is no longer
narrowly tailored to the government's interest. The First Amendment will not allow
limits that prohibit contributions of $320 in terms of 1976 dollars because the limit is
no longer narrowly tailored to address the identified evil without unnecessarily abridg-
ing First Amendment freedoms.
Chief Judge Emeritus Karlton of the Eastern District of California recently ruled
that the contribution limits included in California's Proposition 208' were not con-
stitutionally permissible because they were set at such a low level that they precluded
the opportunity to conduct a meaningful debate. 0 Judge Karlton explained that "the
adoption of the variable limits [of Proposition 208] reflects a conclusion on the part of
65. National political parties are allowed to make coordinated expenditures "in connection with the
general election campaign of candidates for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(1) (1994). Specific
figures for individual states are calculated pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1994).
66. The DSCC was forced to pay a $75,000 civil penalty in 1995 to the Federal Election Com-
mission under the Conciliation Agreement for Matter Previously Under Review (MUR) 3620 (dealing
with complaints filed by the John Seymour U.S. Senate Committee and the National Republican Sena-
torial Committee regarding the DSCC's "Tally" program). The DSCC, however, continued with its
Tally program through the 1996 election cycle. See Federal Election Comm'n, Press Release: FEC
Releases 10 Compliance Cases (Oct. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS, Campaign Library, Federal Cam-
paign Finance File.
67. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(2) (1994) ("No multi candidate political committee shall make contributions-
(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal
office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000 ....").
68. "Raising contribution limits would force money that is being contributed outside of the federal
system, namely 'soft money,' back into the system. Funds within the federal system are subject to dis-
closure and thus accountable to the FECA and the public at large." Memorandum from Pauline A.
Schneider, supra note 20, at 4.
69. California Political Reform Act of 1996, Proposition 208, Cal. Legis. Serv. A-6 (West) (codi-
fied at various sections of CAL. GOV'T CODE).
70. California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. Civ. S-96-1965, slip op. at
36 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998).
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the voters that the $200 limit suffices to address the issue of corruption even if it is
not the lowest amount which would do so."'" Therefore, the lower California $100
limit for some candidates is not closely drawn (and consequently impermissible) since
it restricts associational rights to a degree unnecessary to achieve the governmental
purpose. 2 Similarly, the Buckley Court's approval of the $1000 contribution limit
reflects a conclusion on the part of the Court that the $1000 limit suffices to address
the issue of corruption, even if it is not the lowest amount which would do so. Hence,
today's limit worth $320 is not narrowly drawn because it restricts associational rights
to a degree unnecessary to achieve the governmental purpose.
The Buckley Court found that the FECA contribution limits were acceptable
because "[t]he Act's $1000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of
large campaign contributions-the narrow aspect of political association where the
actuality and potential for corruption have been identified."" Even assuming that
most large contributors do not seek improper influence over a candidate's position or
an officeholder's action, the Buckley Court held that the $1000 limits are not overbroad
because "[n]ot only is it difficult to isolate suspect contributions, but, more important-
ly, Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the
appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the pro-
cess of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated."7
The FECA individual contribution limits, after twenty years of inflation, are no
longer narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of contributors' First Amend-
ment rights. Buckley stated that a $1000 limit in 1976 did not unnecessarily restrict the
contributor's rights because the Act.
leave[s] persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate
actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but
nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with finan-
cial resources. Significantly, the Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not
undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion
of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institu-
tional press, candidates and political parties."
We believe many of today's contributors' rights are unnecessarily abridged.
Although contributors are free to engage in independent expenditures and to volunteer
services, the contribution limits no longer allow them to assist candidates with finan-
cial resources to a substantial extent. Providing $1000 in 1998 money is no longer
tantamount to substantial assistance to a candidate. Additionally, at some point in the
future, the value of $1000 will be almost negligible (say the equivalent of $1 in 1976
money). At that point, a court would surely recognize the limits do not allow the con-
tributor to assist to a substantial extent. The value of $1000 in 1998 is sliding quickly
and surely down the slope towards a negligible value, and is closer to being the equiv-
alent of a "negligible $1" in 1976 money than the $1000 substantial contribution rec-
ognized by the Court in Buckley.
71. California Prolife Council Political Action Committee, slip op. at 27.
72. Id. at 28.
73. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added).
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There are many ways for a supporter of a candidate to express views to a candi-
date and/or render assistance to the campaign. Methods for showing support range
from the most basic (but ultimately important) act of voting, to writing a letter to
express a viewpoint, to volunteering time or expertise, to contributing money. Contri-
butions of money have a uniquely expressive value which can be separated, for exam-
ple, from a vote, because contributions allow contributors to specify not only which
candidates they agree with 6 but also the intensity of their support.' Additionally,
the delivery of support by means of contributions, rather than only at the ballot box,
has the advantage of funding the democratic process." The participatory value of con-
tributions, however, is undermined when the contribution limit is set too low. If, for
example, affording opportunities for expression of the intensity of constituents' view-
points are an important part of the democratic process, then severely limiting the way
that intensi ,, c ,. be;reflected is artidemocrcatc. In 1976, bcause so few people con-
tributed over $1000"9 this restriction was minimal. Now, however, because $1000 is
no longer perceived as a large contribution, the opportunity to register intensity of
support is restricted.
C. Contribution Limits No Longer Allow Candidates to Amass the Funds
Necessary to Communicate a Campaign Message
The Court in Buckley recognized that, "Given the important role of contributions
in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact
on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees
from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy."' Contribution limits
are now having this feared impact on political expenditures. The $1000 contribution
limit, after twenty years of inflation, does not allow candidates to amass the sufficient
campaign funds necessary to effectively communicate their campaign message. Candi-
dates are well aware of the increased cost of campaigning, but are hampered by the
outdated contribution limits of the 1970s. The harmful effects of the contribution limits
on the candidate's ability to communicate are further exacerbated by two concurrent
forces. From one direction is the decreased value of a $1000 contribution and from the
other is the increased cost (outpacing inflation) of running an effective modem cam-
paign.
76. David Strauss describes this as "the problem of bundling," and explains that "a system of de-
livering contributions might better reflect popular sentiment than a system of delivering votes." because
"a voter is likely to approve. of some positions a candidate takes and disapprove of others, but she
can only vote in favor of or against the candidate's entire package . . . . A contributor can make a
legislator's reward depend precisely on the degree to which the legislator has taken positions of which
the contributor approves .... " David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Re-
form, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1374 (1994); see also JAMES D. GwARTNEY & RICHARD E. WAGNER,
Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTION-
AL ECONOMICS 10 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988).
77. A voter cannot express degrees of enthusiasm for a candidate or views at the ballot box be-
cause of the limited options of voting for, voting against, or abstaining. A contributor, however, can
give contributions in direct proportion to the intensity of his or her views. Strauss, supra note 76, at
1374.
78. Id. Campaign contributions devoted to conveying information and arguments from candidates
to citizens is an essential function of a representative government. Id. at 1375.
79. See discussion infra Part IV(C).
80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
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Although many contributors would prefer to donate higher dollar amounts to
insure their chosen candidate communicates effectively with the electorate, they are
restricted by antiquated limits. In discussing the effect of the $1000 limits, the Buckley
Court stated,
There is no indication, however, that the contribution limitations imposed by the
Act would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and
political associations. The overall effect of the [limits] is merely to require can-
didates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons
and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the
statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to
reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political ex-
pression."
The Buckley Court found it particularly significant (noting twice) that 94.9% of funds
raised by candidates for Congress in 1974 came from contributions of $1000 or less. 2
The Court also stated that the contribution limits would not "undermine to any material
degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign
issues by... candidates." 3 This lack of concern by the Court about the effect in
1976 of the new contribution limits on the candidate's ability to communicate was
understandable at that time, because the limit was set high enough that it would only
effect the 5.1% of contributors who gave contributions of over $1000.
It is, of course, impossible to predict with certainty what percent of individual
contributors would be responsible for contributions in excess of $1000 if the contribu-
tion limit were raised or eliminated. Within the current constraints, however, there has
been a clear trend towards larger individual contributions. In the 1996 election cycle
not only were more funds raised from individual contributions over $500 than under
$500," but also, for the first time, more funds were raised from contributions of
amounts between $750 and $1000 than from contributions of amounts less than
$200.5 It has been estimated that a successful Republican presidential candidate in
2000 will have to find 18,000-19,000 contributors willing to donate $1000 in order to
raise the necessary $32.1 million for the primary campaign." Because the Republican
universe of $1000 donors appears to be around 50,000 nationwide, 7 it will be diffi-
cult for one candidate to convince over one-third of those possible donors to contribute
$1000. If the Court in 1976 had observed a situation (like the current one) where a
81. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
82. See id. at 21 n.23, 26 n.27.
83. Id. at 29.
84. See Federal Election Comm'n, Press Release 16 (Apr. 14, 1997) (on file with author).
85. Id. at 2. Individual contributions to both Senate and House campaigns in 1995-96 were as
follows: contribution amounts less than $200 totaled $158,502,771, contribution amounts between $200
and $499 totaled $55,460,410, contribution amounts between $500 and $749 totaled $71,491,158 and
contribution amounts more than $749 totaled $158,566,605. Id. at 16.
86. STAN HUCKABY, ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARY PROcEss 2 (1997). Similarly, the successful Democratic candidates in the 2000 presidential
primary will need to find 16,000 contributors willing to donate $1000. Id.
87. "The Republican universe of $1,000 donors appears to be between 45,000 and 50,000 contri-
butors. This number allows for contributors who gave to more than one 1996 primary candidate and
those who decided they could not support any of the 1996 Republican candidates. . . . The
Democrats' universe of $1,000 donors appears to be undefined as yet based on the large increase from
1992 to 1996 of $1,000 donors." Id. at 5.
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substantial percentage of contributors were contributing over $750 to campaigns, then
it is likely it would not have approved a contribution limit set it $1000 because the
limit would "have a dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political
associations.""8 The adverse effect of the limit also raises representational concerns
because those declining to run or retiring from the United States Senate now generally
note -as a reason the difficulty and time consuming nature of fundraising. 9
A major force from the other direction is the increased cost since 1976 of run-
ning a modern campaign.' An example the Buckley Court used as demonstrative of
the cost of campaigning was the cost of a newspaper advertisement.9 The record
shows that as of January 1, 1975, one full-page advertisement in a daily edition of a
certain metropolitan newspaper (The Washington Post) cost $6,971.04.' One full-
page advertisement in a February 1998 daily edition of The Washington Post costs
'"2,347.60. Siilarly, ,in 1974 a $1000 contribution bought 10,000 first-class post-
age stamps. But today, a $1000 contribution will buy only 3125 first-class stamps.
That means a candidate needs to raise close to four times as much money to purchase
a newspaper advertisement today, or raise three $1000 contributions to mail the same
number of campaign flyers as $1000 reached in 1974.
Aside from the increased cost of traditional campaign methods such as newspa-
per advertisements and mailings, new technology and- sophisticated campaign tech-
niques have also increased the costs of an effective campaign beyond the increases
attributed merely to inflation. While a congressional candidate in the 1970s might have
been successful utilizing a volunteer campaign manager and treasurer, today an effec-
tive campaign has a professional (meaning paid) campaign manager and fundraising
staff, and must budget for legal and accounting expenses (to fill out FEC forms and
ensure compliance with the current amalgamation of laws) along with polling and
campaign consultants to produce and place advertisements. Voters expect a credible
candidate to have professional appearing and sounding commercials, which are expen-
sive to produce. Once the commercials are produced, the proliferation of cable and
satellite television stations means that viewers are no longer easily reachable through
88. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
89. Separate from the state interest of eliminating corruption or the appearance of it, scholars have
argued that decreasing the amount of time candidates spend fundraising should be a goal of campaign
finance reform. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Cam-
paign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1281
(1994); BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLrIcAL PROCESS 91-92
(rev. ed. 1990); ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPnON 96 (1983).
Columbia Law Professor Vincent Blasi has taken the "need to protect candidates' time" argument a
step further and suggested that candidate time protection is a permissible state interest under Buckley.
Blasi, supra. While Blasi's premise that candidates spend too much time fundraising is certainly debat-
able, if he is correct then increasing the individual contribution limit addresses protection of candidates'
time more effectively (in terms of First Amendment protection, and in practical application) than Blas-
i's preferred remedy of expenditure limits. As one Senator explained, "The 'money chase' is rhetoric,
not reality. But if there is any truth to it at all, it is because of the added difficulty imposed by the
1974 contribution limits." Senator Mitch McConnell, Campaign Finance "Reform": A View from Capi-
tol Hill, FREE SPEECH AND ELECTION LAW NEWS, Fall 1996, at 2.
90. The Buckley Court recognized, "The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio and
other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indis-
pensable instruments of effective political speech." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
91. Id. at 20.
92. Id.
93. Telephone Inquiry to the Advertising Department of The Washington Post (Feb. 5, 1998).
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the placement of television commercials on the local broadcast network affiliates.
Instead, the diffusion of viewers away from networks and towards other media sources
has driven up the cost of purchasing a Gross Ratings Point.94 Together, these factors
require a campaign to raise vastly more money to have the same communicative im-
pact. The present limit significantly impairs a candidate's ability to meet that chal-
lenge.
V. CONCLUSION
In a democratic system of government where individual liberty interests are
cherished, the right of citizens to paiticipate in politics is not only desirable, but imper-
ative. While there are many ways individuals can participate in elections, it is impor-
tant that the competing ideas of the political marketplace (and not government reg-
ulation) determine who is and is not ultimately successful. Buckley and its progeny
have repeated this commitment by reinforcing that the government may not interfere
with the flow of political speech, absent a compelling governmental interest. While the
interest of preventing corruption allows contribution limits to be imposed in our politi-
cal marketplace, these limits may only remain if they are narrowly tailored and actual-
ly serve that interest.
Inflation in the 1970s gave rise to the term "bracket creep," when high inflation,
coupled with nonindexed tax brackets, created new incentives for tax evasion and
meant working families paid higher taxes but had less spending power. Congress final-
ly remedied that situation in the early 1980s by passing legislation to index the tax
brackets. But the same inflation which led to bracket creep has, over time, devalued
the giving and spending power of the $1000 federal individual contribution limits and
created the force for its circumvention. The difference is that over twenty years later,
and with individual contributions now worth less than one-third of their value when
passed, Congress has still not raised or indexed the contribution limits. Because Con-
gress has failed to act, FECA's antiquated contribution limits have created an unwork-
able, unsatisfying and, most importantly, unconstitutional condition in the one area of
law that can least tolerate it. Absent immediate legislation which correctly remedies the
situation,95 the burden will once again fall on the judiciary to remedy unconstitutional
impulses or effects of Congress' mismanagement of our First Amendment.
94. Dave Mason of the Heritage Foundation has suggested that the cost of purchasing Gross Rat-
ings Points may have doubled (or more) from just 1986 to 1996. Telephone interview with Dave
Mason, Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation (Oct. 1997).
95. Senator Mitch McConnell has introduced a bill which raises the individual contribution limit
to presidential candidates to $10,000 per election ($20,000 per cycle). S. 1416, 105th Cong. (1997).
Additionally, Senator McConnell advocates raising the individual contribution limits for Congressional
races to $3000 and indexing the limits for future elections.
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